SITUS PROBLEMS IN ENEMY PROPERTY MEASURES
ERNST RABEL*

It is difficult at the present stage of developments to discuss the problems in conflict of laws that will arise from the current war. The different measures that have
been taken in various countries are largely provisional in character; future regulations are not easily predictable. There are, however, available to us certain general
principles and experiences of the last war.' Those principles converge, verbally at
least, around the situs of property. It is therefore largely toward that concept that
the present discussion is directed.
I. Ti

SIGNIFICANCE OF SITus

Lack of Uniformity in Treatment'of Enemy Property
During the present war, enemy property has been treated separately by practically every one of the countries that are at war or have broken diplomatic relations
with the Axis. Measures, such as seizures, freezing, compulsory administration and
grant of licenses or sale, generally have a triple purpose. The state seeks to prevent
the enemy from detrimental use of the funds involved, to avail itself of these funds
for the promotion of war, and to secure satisfaction of claims against the enemy
state or nationals. In nature, all these measures are provisional, having in view an
eventual final settlement. In the case of sales of enemy property, the question of
compensation is reserved. In this country, although tide to property seized by the
Alien Property Custodian is fully vested in him, he has declared that no step is being
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undertaken that may interfere with the ultimate disposition pursuant to the policy
to be determined by Congress.2
During the first World War the situation was analogous. The final regulation
in the peace treaties with the Central Powers maintained the principle (with a few
qualifications) that every Allied or associated country should be entitled separately
to liquidate enemy property in its territory, although this particular phase of the
regulation was not emphasized in the fundamental text of Article 297 (b) of the
Treaty of Versailles. This article was to the effect that "the Allied and Associated
Powers reserve the right to retain and liquidate all property, rights and interests
belonging at the date of the coming into force of the present Treaty to German
nationals, or companies controlled by them, within their territories, colonies, possessions and protectorates, including territories ceded to them by the present Treaty."'
Territory acquired by an Allied state subsequent to the effective date of the Versailles Treaty (January io, i92o) under another of the "Paris suburb treaties" was
not included, nor did the right of liquidation extend to property situated in the
vanquished countries.4 The provisional war measures, including those taken by
the Central Powers, were ratified (art. 297) but the defeated countries had to compensate the nationals of the victorious states as well as their own nationals, who,
by the force of circumstances, received but a minimal indemnification.
What system will prevail after the present conflagration is unknown, but some
of the discussions published thus far seem to indicate that whatever burdens will
be imposed on German private property in Germany, it will not be subject to technical liquidation as enemy property. The same territorial distinction that was made
after the last war seems to be primordial. Indeed, the outline of this distinction is
already being shaped by the evident difference of policies under which German foreign investments and the population of occupied portions of Germany are being
treated.
It is entirely unknown, however, to what extent the United States will retain
the property seized. Looking back to the eventful history of Congressional Acts
and activities of the Alien Property Custodians from

1917

to

1934

and remember-

ing searching discussions of principles and ideals involved,' we may imagine many
possibilities. Nor is there any visible hint whether this time each Allied country by
itself will again be entitled to adopt independent provisions for the disposition of
enemy property or whether some pool will be formed, as certain proposals seem
to have suggested.
'
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Extensive Coverage of Existing Measures
There is also another reason that the present war decrees concerning enemy
property do not afford a good basis for an analysis of the eventual personal or territorial limitations. Broad as were the similar economic warfare measures in the
last war, they have been greatly surpassed in this. The previous Trading with the
Enemy Acts and related regulations have been extended and their gaps circumspectly filled in view of the huge interests involved, the enormous increase of industrial war supply and the extreme resourcefulness and ruthlessness of the aggressors. Thus, the "freezing" orders and the use of alien patents in this country
include assets of the nationals of Axis-subjugated countries; presumably these measures are to be withdrawn as soon as possible. The countries that have shifted their
alliance to the United Nations present another problem. But even insofar as only
the war with Germany and Japan is concerned, the concept of "enemy" or "national" of enemy countries has been defined on both sides in the broadest manner.
It includes individuals of enemy nationality, domiciliaries of enemy countries, the
corporations and other organizations constituted in these countries, having their
principal place there, or in any way "controlled" by enemies, control being presumed
in various situations.6 All three criteria used by competitive theories to designate the
connection of a corporation with a country-incorporation, domicil (seat), and control-have been coordinated, any one sufficing to impress the character of enemy
upon a corporation.
This applies to neutral individuals and organized bodies as well as to citizens of
Allied countries and corporations organized in Allied countries, and naturally produces overlapping grounds of seizure by the several countries. That the various
Allied alien property custodians have devised a scheme for dividing their files has
not been revealed. On the contrary, not even Great Britain and the Dominions
seem to have arranged an understanding. An informative book of 1943 states that
conflicting claims do arise, as when Canadian shares, endorsed in blank for transfer,
are physically situated in an English bank, to the order of a trustee in South Africa,
under a trust with an enemy beneficiary. "All three custodians may claim the
7
shares, and the asset will probably be reported in each of the countries."
In the period following the last war, a few interallied agreements and also some
arrangements with the enemy offices were reached, supplemented by the rulings of
the Mixed Arbitral Tribunals. However, for delimiting the exercise of the right of
liquidation, the only established basis was the territorial distinction of all property
according to its location.
The Force of Territorialism
The principle of territorialism, granting a state exclusive sovereign power over a
part of the earth's surface, is so firmly rooted in the forceful traditions of international
6 As to freezing regulations, see Note, Foreign Funds Control Through Presidential Freezing Orders
(1941)

41 COL. L. REv. 1039, 1045; as to trading with the enemy generally, see DOM5 E, TRADINo wrrii

•HE ENEMY IN WORLD WAR II (1943) passim.
'F. C. HOWARD, TRADING WITH THE ENEMnY

(London, 1943) 83.
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law that it will again prevail in some form as a matter of course after this war in
the relations among the allied countries, between them and the enemy countries,
and in the relationship towards the neutrals.
Mr. Justice Brandeis, speaking for the Supreme Court of the United States in
the case of an undemanded bank deposit seized by the State of California under
its statute on escheat, pointed out8 that under the Court's decisions, the proceedings
for escheat,' as well as for confiscation,-' forfeiture," condemnation 2 and similar
matters, are not "in personam" but "in rem." In a recent case of escheat, the
Supreme Court explained that it does not matter so much whether the proceedings
are called in rem or quasi in rem; what matters is that the obligation of a bank to
pay in accordance with the terms of the deposit is a part of the mass of property
subject to state control, wherefore due process of law is satisfied with fair notice
3
and opportunity to the possible owner to be heard.'
The recent comprehensive discussions in this country devoted to the extraterritorial effect of the Soviet nationalization decrees 14 and of the German exchange
restrictions," testify anew to the persistence of the principle in its several aspects.
On the one hand, it is an often repeated thesis that "the courts of one country
will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another done within its
own territory."" As the State Department reminded an American citizen complaining about the interference of the German "transfer" prohibitions with his investment: "Investments or funds within the jurisdiction of a foreign country are
subject to the laws of that country. In the absence of specific treaty provisions to
the contrary, there is no way in which a private person may secure immunity from
the local law for his investments or property held within the jurisdiction of a par17
ticular state."'
Thus, the confiscatory Soviet decrees have been finally recognized in almost all
countries to the extent that they affect the property situated in the Soviet territory.'
See Security Savings Bank v. State of California, 263 U. S. 282, 287 (1923).
'Christiansen v. King County, 239 U. S. 356 (1915).
" Act of Congress of July 17, 1862, S§5-7, 13 STA-T. 272; The Confiscation Cases, 20 Wall. 92 (U. S.
1873).
"'Friedenstein v. United States, 125 U. S. 224 (1888).
Huling v. Kaw Valley Ry., 130 U. S. 559 (x889).
t Anderson Nat. Bank v. Luckett, 321 U. S. 233 (944).

t'Borchard, ExtraterritorialConfiscations (1942) 36 AM. J. INT L. 275, 276 n. 9; Jessup, The Litvinov
4ssignment and the Pink Case, id. at 282, 285; Gilligan, ExtraterritorialEffect of Foreign Decrees and
Seizures (1940) 88 U. oF PA. L. REv. 983, 988; Note, Protective Expropriatory Decrees of the Governments in Exile (941) 41 CoL. L. REv. 1072, 1077.
" Freutel, Exchange Control, Freezing Orders and the Conflict of Laws (942) 56 HARv. L. Rav.
30; DomxE, op. cit. supra note 6, at 314 ff.
" Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U. S. 250 (1897); Polydore v. Prince, Fed. Cas. No. 11257 (D. Me.

1I837).
172 HACKwORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1941) 71; cf. Holzer v. Deutsche ReichsbahnGesellschaft, 277 N. Y. 474, 14 N. E. (2d) 798 (1938); Branderbit v. Hamburg-America Line, 31
N. Y. S. (2d) 588 (Sup. Ct. 2d Dept. 194).
" Salimoff & Co. v. Standard Oil Co. of New York, 26z N. Y. 22o, 186 N. E. 679 (1933);

Vladikovkazsky Ry. Co. v. New York Trust Co., 263 N. Y. 369, 189 N. E. 456 (1934).

England: (on

condition of recognition of the foreign government by the government of the forum) Luther v. Sagor
[19211 1 K. B. 456, rev'd after the recognition [1921] 3 K. B. 532; CHESHItIE, PAIVATE INTERNATIONAL
L..W (2d ed. 1938) 151. The European courts have finally recognized that branches of nationalized
Russian corporations have been dissolved.
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On the other hand, American courts,1" like all others,20 have consistently refused
to give effect to foreign confiscations in application to property situated in the forum

or even a third country. The forum's public policy, obviously is also reflected in
this rule. Guided by international treaties, it may work in opposite directions in

the two types of cases and is the strongest component factor in the matter of forcible
seizures.
Interplay of Territorialism and Public Policy

For recognizing a belligerent's confiscatory seizures beyond its territory, a specific
reason is needed. The Versailles Treaty was ratified and published as internal law
by Germany and was thereby binding. Conversely, economic war implies the absence of any recognition whatever of seizures by enemies or neutrals, so long as

the war lasts. Thus, the two periods pending and after the war are sharply
distinguishable.
During wartime, as is the case at the present writing, the one-sided hostile seizures by a belligerent are, naturally, repudiated by the foe. Moreover, from 1914 to
1918 refusal of recognition of such acts could be based on a principle of international

law that was not even questioned, at least not on the European Continent. An
American federal court hardly needed to argue that American law should apply to a
partnership between an American and a German partner carrying on business in the
United States in order to reach the result that the common law rule annulling the
contract should apply and that a German court decree inimical to the American partner should be refused recognition. 2' Whatever the applicable law, a German hostile
measure was ineffective in this country, if in fact such was the nature of the appointment of a "Pfleger" (absence trustee); if, on the other hand, it was merely conservative, for the protection of the American partner, recognition was due.2 2 The
German Supreme Court concluded, even after the effective date of the Peace Treaty,
that English and French seizures during the war, contrary to international law,
could not excuse non-payment of a debt or non-restitution of property to the person
" In recent years: Weber v. Johnson, 15 N. Y. S. (2d) 770 (Sup. Ct. N. Y. County, 1939); Anninger
v. Hohenberg (1939) 172 Misc. 1046, 18 N. Y. S. (2d) 499 (1939). The hope has been expressed that
the doctrine of Pink v. United States, 315 U. S. 203 (1942) may be confined to the scope of the
Lirvinov Agreement: Borchard, supra note 14; Jessup, supra note 14; Note (1942) 51 YALE L. J. 848;
LAUTERPACHT,

ANNUAL DIasr AND REPORTS OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL

LAW CASES 1938-1942 (1942)

141, 150.
2

England: The Jupiter No. 3 [1927J P. D. 122, afl'd [1927] P. D. 25o; Banco de Vizcaya v.

Don Alfonso de Borbon y Austria [1935] s K. B. 14o; The El Condado, 63 L. L. L. R. 330 (Scot. Ct.
of Sessions, 1939).

France: Soci&t Potasas Ibericas v. Bloch, Cass.-civ., March 14, 1939, 34 REv. Canr. nz Da. INT.
PRuvk (1939) 28o, 6 Nouv. REv. DE DR. INT. (1939) x63 and precedents cited in the- notes thereto.
Germany: Reichsgericht cases reported in 6o ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES REIcnsars-s IN ZIVILm.sCHEN
(hereinafter cited as RGZ.) 3oo; 63 id. 93, 183; xo6 id. 83; s1o id. 173; 119 id. 259, etc.
" Mayer v. Garvan, 278 Fed. 27 (C. C. A. ist, 1922), fundamentally criticized by Anderson,
dissenting.
55
Hennequin v. German Gov't, Franco-German Mixed Arb. Trib., July 13, 1922, 2 RECUEIL, supra
note 4, at 3o5; L. Weil v. German Gov't, same, Dec. is, 1922, 2 id. at 771. In another case before
the same tribunal the German measure was qualified as a war supervision. Decision of May 13, 1922,
2 id. at ss6.
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originally entitled thereto and that the resulting default continued to be legally
significant. 3
Neutrals likewise normally withold any recognition to exceptional war measures
for the double reason that public law is inapplicable in a foreign court and that
foreign measures implementing war "in the economic or any other domain" must
be disregarded.24 This attitude is in harmony with general principles. Penal and
political, as well as confiscatory, foreign laws and decrees are traditionally refused
recognition. Deprivation of property without due process of law and just compensation is considered contrary to international law, as well, generally, as to the
fundamental conceptions of the forum. A more flexible approach, however, has
been adopted toward such matters as annulment of gold clauses and prohibition
of certain money payments, especially when a court has seen that its own legislature
has been compelled or was likely to resort to measures similar to those previously
held repugnant to basic institutions. Nevertheless, German courts rejected Hungarian debtors' excuse based on the ground of Hungarian transfer restrictions,"
and the Swiss Federal Tribunal continued to deny to German exchange legislation
any extraterritorial effect, 20 on the ground that these measures formed part of an
economic belligerence, protecting domestic and discriminating against foreign interests. This view, which has been advocated in this country, 27 seems much more
satisfactory than a third rationale, to the effect that the debtor is responsible for not
being able to pay, since his own state has caused his inability; he should bear the
risk of damage occasioned by such legislation while he enjoys the benefits procured
by the national economy of which he is a part 2 However this may be, evidently
the facts and their relation to the forum ought to be carefully investigated before
"public policy" is invoked to refuse recognition. Thus, it would follow that war
measures of an allied country, aiming at the same goal, are to be sustained to the
extent that they are not harmful to the forum's own war policy. This is what has
resulted, though on an insecure basis, in the cases maintaining the decree of the
"' Reichsgericht, September 22, 1930, 13o RGZ. 23, 30. See also the decision of June x3, 1934, 145
RGZ. 16 at ig.
2 Compagnie Universelle de TVlgraphie et de Ta6phone Sans Fil v. United Service Corp., 84 N. J.
Eq. 6o64, 95 Ad. 187 (1915); Swiss Fed. Trib. decision of Dec. 17, 1914, 40 ENTSC-EEDUNGEN DEtS
BuNEsGERclrrs (hereinafter cited as BGE.) I, 483 (French decree preventing a French insurance company to accept premium payment by enemy). Accord, Swiss Fed. Trib., April 57, 196, 42 id. II, 179,
(1917) Rv. DR. INT. PRuvk, 348, Journal Clunet, 1917, 3o6; Trib. Monaco, May 24, 1917, Journal Clunet,
1917, x5o8, (1917) Ray. DR. INT. PsuvA 602 (French prohibition of payment); Trib. Gen ve, Nov. 30,
1917, Journal Clunet, X918, 765, (19x8) REv. Da. INT. PaRVI 190 (German sequestration in occupied
Russian Poland).
2 Kammergericht, Oct. 27, 1932, (1932) JUR. Wocs. 3773; Landgericht Berlin I, Feb. 19, 1932,
(1932) JUR. WocH. 2306.
" 6o BGE. II, 294, 31o; 61 id. 242, 246; 62 II id. io8. The rejection extends to the case where the
debt is governed by German law, see decision of March 2, 1937, 63 id. II 42, PRAXS D. BG. (2937) 115.
"' Freutel, supra note i, at 58.
2 2 RAAPE, DEurscHEs INTERNATIONALEN PRIVATRECHT (1939) 315, 321, approving position taken
by KOEXI'PEL, DIE Darxscss DEviSFNGESETGBUNO IM INTrERNATIONALEN PRIVATREcHT (1938) (not available to the writer).
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Netherlands that vested Dutch private property in the Crown, 20 and (in England)
sanctioning requisition of vessels by the Norwegian government30
But do foreign prohibitions of disposition such as are included in the Trading
with the Enemy Acts never excuse a debtor? It is noteworthy that not only the
Dutch courts but also the German ReichsgerichtP' accepted the justification of nonperformance factually caused by the obstacles in the English Trading with the
Enemy Act, correctly in the present writer's opinion, though contrary to the courts
of many other jurisdictions.
TerritorialLimitations Despite Treaty

Having accepted the peace treaty, the vanquished countries had to recognize all
seizures and ensuing liquidations in the adversary countries. The territorial limits,
however, remained. The victor was entitled only to take property within its territory. For instance, the authority of an alien property trustee was restricted to his
territory, a phenomenon familiar to the common law. A law suit won in an English court against a German debtor nominally represented by the trustee, could not
have the effect of res judicata against the debtor as respects the latter's property
32

situated in Germany

The principle governing relations between neutral countries and the parties to
any international treaty is very clearly settled. With regard to third states a treaty
is res inter alios acta; "a treaty creates law only between the States being parties
to it.:"3 There are, however, exceptions to the principle, and among them is the
case where a third state, according to its own conflicts rules, has to apply the law
of one of the states participating in the treaty and incorporating it into its law. In
this sense, in the Netherlands, Switzerland, Luxemburg, 4 and possibly elsewhere,
29 Anderson v. N. V. Transadine Handelsmaatschappij, 289 N. Y. 9, 43 N. E. (2d) 502 (1942); see
for other cases 65 N. Y. STATE BAR Ass'N REP. (1942) 275.

"0Lorentzen v. Lydden & Co. [1942] 2 K. B. 202.
supra note 14, at 287 n. 19.

On an analogous Swedish decision see Jessup,

SThe Netherlands: Trib. Rotterdam, Oct. 5, 19x6, reported in VAN HASSELT, Dr NEDERLANDsCE
143; also, other decisions therein cited at x4l.
Germany: Reichsgericht, June 28, 1918, 93 RGZ. 182 (English company in Buenos Aires excused
from non-delivery of goods).
"5 Stamm & Cie v. Henning, Anglo-German Mixed Arb. Trib., 2 RECUEIL, supra note 4, ot 875;
Brixhe and Deblon v.Agrippina, German-Belg. Mixed Arb. Trib., March 31, 1922, 2 id. 7; Peeters, van
Haute et Duyver v. Trommer et Griiber (same trib.) 2 id. at 384. This was not understood by the App.
Brussels, July 15, 1921, 1 id. at 713, where the appointment of a custodian by the Court of Sessions in
Edinburgh was held good for standing in court in Belgium, because "English" law governed the contract.
RECHTSPRAAK BETR. INT. PRIVATRECHr (1936)

"Judgment

No. 7, May 25, 1925, P. C. I. J., Ser. A No. 7, P. 29; ANzILoTrr,

TERNAT'IONAL (1929)

Couns DE Daorr IN-

414.

"' Peace treaty provisions have been applied under this theory in the Netherlands: Deutsche Bank v.
Zirini, Trib. s'Gravenhage, Feb. 7, 1922, WEEKBLAAD x1o0o, aff'd, Appel s'Gravenhage, Nov. 30, 1922,
11161, WILLIAMS AND LAUTERI'ACTr,
WEEKtSLAAD 11094, re-afl'd, Hooge Raad, Jan. so, 1924, WEEKBLAA1A
324, case No. 235; dec. of
DIGEST OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES, 1919-1922 (932)
13, 1928, Court of Appeal, Amsterdam, WEExBLAAD 11816, McNAIR AND L WTRPACHT, ANNUAL
DIGEST OF PUBLIC INtERNATIONAL LAWv CASES, 1927-1928 (1932) 414, case No. 285. The related rule
ANNUAL

March

that the Peace Treaty is not applied when the law of the forum governs appears in the decision of the
Swiss Federal Tribunal, infra n. 35. Likewise the Court of Appeals of Luxembourg, May 29, 1925,
Journal Clunet, 1929, 472, 476. Cf. Chailley, in RiPERTOIRE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL (De Lapradelle
et Niboyet) Supp. (1934) 324, No. 168.
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the tenth part of the Versailles Treaty has been given effect so as to modify private
rights and obligations existing between the subjects of former enemy states.
The Swiss Federal Tribunal has declared its position in two cases, both denying
the application of the Versailles Treaty despite the fact that both parties belonged
to states bound thereby. "Since Switzerland is not a party to the Peace Treaty of
Versailles, its provisions have no force of law in our territory. ''3 3 In the first case
the insurance contract on which the action was based was governed by Swiss law
by virtue of a stipulation as well as the Swiss place of performance; the second concerned a problem of Swiss judicial jurisdiction, which, pertaining to Swiss public
law, could not be altered by any event connected with French war seizures or
administration.
A distinguished Swiss author, writing after the first of these decisions, has insisted on the bilateral character of the treaty provisions. By the consent of the vanquished nations, the war measures should have been accorded international recognition, even by the neutral states. They should not be applied in the latter, however, to the extent that they offend the public policy of the forum or seek to control
property situated in the territory or legal relationships governed, under the private
international law of the neutral court, by the law of the forum 8 This formula,
less cautious than the language of the Swiss Federal Court in acknowledging the
modifications worked by the peace treaties on private law relations, may yet fairly
describe the actual position of the neutrals.
It cannot be expected that those states which neither participate in the eventual
treaties nor, by a formal act of recognition, join in their enforcement, will agree to
any and all measures affecting property situated in their own territories. That this
alone causes some substantial problems will be illustrated hereafter. In view of the
many difficulties that will arise on the termination of the present cataclysm a fair
understanding with the neutral powers would be highly desirable.
II. THE SITus oF SIMPLE DEBTS
Although it is frequently asserted that debts not embodied in an instrument
have no situs, the necessity of localizing them under traditional analyses is evident
in many fields, such as taxation, involuntary assignment (a class including war
seizures and liquidations), jurisdiction for litigation, death duties, grant of probate
and administration of estates. These purposes require differentiated treatment. The
criteria of localization, too, are differently selected in the various countries. Nevertheless, there exists a natural temptation in discussing one subject to look for analogies in another, particularly so in the matter of war measures which enjoy very
little judicial authority, since the victorious powers have generally excluded enemy
aliens from relief in the courts on account of property seizures. The most popular
resort is that made to jurisdiction for garnishment. Seizures are compared with
" Bundesgericht, November 4, 1920, 46 BGE. II 421, at 423; same trib.
December ix. 1925, 5i id. I
417, at 420.
"t SAUSER-HALL, Op. cit. supra note i, at 41, 43.
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the order prohibiting the garnishee to pay his original creditor, and liquidation is
comparable to the order divesting the original creditor of his right and transferring
it to the garnishor.
Analogies from Systems of Conflicts Rules in Garnishment
The procedural rules regulating garnishment are too diverse to be discussed
here. With respect to the jurisdiction for the final expropriating decree, three systems may be distinguished.
(a) In France,37 Germany3" and most other Continental countries, garnishment
(saisie-arr&, Forderungspfaendung) has to be sought at the domicil of the debtor's
debtor. The French Court of Cassation takes the exclusive nature of jurisdiction
at that place so seriously that French courts have been declared without jurisdiction against a garnishee domiciled abroad, just as in a case of seizure against other
property situated abroad 9 Under this French private international law rule,
Alsatian courts, assuming jurisdiction at the domicil of the garnishee, have applied
their own local civil procedure differing from the French.4 °
The German doctrine rests on the broadest imaginable generalization of Section
23 of the Code of Civil Procedure, whereby, for the purpose of jurisdiction in a
personal action, a debt is situated at the debtor's domicil. If the garnishee is domiciled abroad, the German courts will grant garnishment at the domicil of the principal debtor within the forum, but the Supreme Court has confirmed the view that
the garnishee must be given service of process at his own domicil and that the
efficacy of the grant therefore depends on the readiness of the foreign state.4' It is
well known that neighboring states refuse such cooperation.4 2 .
That the domicil of the garnishee is selected is commonly justified by the double
advantage that this place is ascertainable with relative ease and that, in the development of the old maxim, actor sequitur forum rei, a debtor may be sued at his
domicil even though he is absent and there are other, non-exclusive, jurisdictions.
His assets are deemed to be concentrated there. On this basis, the place where the
debt is to be paid appears immaterial. Procedural steps are taken to safeguard the
interests of the original debtor, but the proceedings are centered in the suit against
the garnishee.
(b) The common law system may become essentially similar under very common
statutes, universally held valid, permitting personal jurisdiction of the debtor through
service of process at his residence even though he cannot be found there. Originally, indeed, as Beale has demonstrated, the custom of London regarded garnish-

3

GLAssor, MOREL ET TISSIER, 4 TkJuTI

LEREEOURS-PIGEONNIiRE,

DE PROCdDURE

CIVILE (3d

PRicrS DE DROIr INTERNATIONAL PRIVi ( 3 d ed.

ed. 1925-36) No. xx66 bis;
1937) 344,

No. 299; ef. iU. at

433, No. 357.

" Reichsgericht, Oct. 12, 1895, 36 RGZ. 355; same, May z6, 1933,
I907, 63 SEUFIE.TS ARCHIV, p. 41, No. 27.
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id. 340; same, June 18,

" Cass.-civ, May 12, 1931, Sircy, 1932, I 137, Dalloz Jur., I933, I 6o.
MOREL ET TISSIER, supra note 37, at No. 1166; adde Koechlin v. Risso, App. Colmar,
" (1933) 540 RGZ. at 343.
March 23, 1938, 59 REv. JURID. D'ALSACE ET DE LoRR. 588.
" GLAsoSN,
2

' SCHNIrZER, HANDBUCH DES INTRNAMToNALE

PRIVATRECHTS (1937) 338.
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ment proceedings as directed in rem against a debt due in London by a debtor
domiciled at the forum 3 It should be noted that modern English courts, although
analyzing the situation of simple debts in terms of personal jurisdiction at the place
where it is "properly recoverable," nevertheless do consider various circumstances.
Thus, Lord Scrutton in a leading case pointed out that the debt arose in London
and that the original debtor appeared in the law suit and submitted to the jurisdiction, obtaining a benefit thereby. He thought that any foreign country would recognize such jurisdiction." As it seems, a normal residence of the garnishee is
generally presupposed,4" and a mere temporary sojourn of the garnishee would perhaps not suffice in England. But in the United States, the courts in overwhelming
majority 6 have construed the proceedings as directed against a debt located for
jurisdictional purposes wherever the garnishee could validly be served with process.
So to speak, the debt is where the garnishee may be sued personally by his creditor.
The Supreme Court of the United States, approving this view, has stated that, under
the full faith and credit clause, any other state has to recognize the double effect
of the proceedings divesting the original debtor and investing the garrishor.47
The fact that in several states domicil does determine jurisdiction, and that this
seems to enjoy interstate effect if fair notice is given to the debtor,4s serves only to
increase the number of jurisdictions having power to dispose of the debt. The
writers have noticed the inconvenience to the original debtor in being compelled at
his peril to appear in any court of the world where his alleged creditor happens to
sue his alleged debtor. By the effect of their procedural institutions, the inconveniences of being cited to come to the garnishee's domicil are not so great and
dangerous in the Continental system. Another danger is that the garnishee may
be compelled to pay the same debt once again in a foreign country where the
American garnishment does not produce res judicata. To obviate this, some English and American decisions have denied the garnishment order if the danger is
convincingly proved. 49 Much criticism by the writers of the entire mechanism of
this institution has been noteworthy 0
(c) In certain legislative systems, it is apparently essential that not only the
garnishee but in addition either the garnishor or the latter's debtor should be
" Beale, The Exercise of Jurisdiction in Rem to Compel Payment of a Debt (1913) 27 HARV. L. REv.
§Io8.2, p. 460 ff.
""See Swiss Bank Corp. v. Boehmische Industrial Bank [1923] i K. B. 673, 682.
"See Lord Atkin, in New York Life Ins. Co. v. Public Trustee [1924] 2 Ch. D. 1, I19: ". • domicile where the creditor could enforce the debt."
"oFor the exceptions see STUMBERo, CONFLICT OF LAW (1937) 101.
"'Harris v. Balk, 198 U. S. 275 (19o5); Louisville and Nashville R. R. v. Deer, 200 U. S. 176
(r9o6); Baltimore and Ohio R. R. v. Hostetter, 240 U. S. 620 (i915); REsTATEMENT, CONFLICTS OF
LAws (1934) §1o8.
"aSee Mr. justice Holmes in McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U. S. 90 (1917) and comment by STUMBERG,
CONFLICT OF LAW (1937) 76.
"Parker, Peebles & Knox v. National Fire Ins. Co., III Conn. 383, 15o Ad. 313 (1930); Note
107; I BEALE, CONFLICTS (935)

(1930) 40 YALE L. J. 139.
ro Beale, in 27 HARv. L. REV. supra note 43, at 12o; GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAws (2d ed. 1938)
§68; NuSSBAUM, PRINCIPLES OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (1943) 207.
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domiciled in the forum.

1

The Swiss courts consider a debt situated at the place of

the creditor's domicil; if, however, this place is abroad, the debt may be attached,
52
and as it seems, also garnished at the Swiss domicil of the debtor.
Among these systems, none of them flawless, evidently only the first, in its rigid
French application, serves the convenience of international harmony. International
recognition for the jurisdiction of the garnishee's domicil has been already postulated.5" French authors have broadened the idea that in international relations a
debt is to be localized at the domicil of the debtor since he is the person who is to
furnish the subject matter of the enforcement." This French doctrine is very firm 5
and probably has strongly influenced the ideas in the background of the Versailles
Treaty.
Doctrine and Application Under Treaty

Under the Peace Treaties of i919 a few voices advocated the domicil of the creditor
or the place where a debt ought to be performed, 0 or a cumulation of requirements. 7 However, practical convenience in this case so evidently favored the
domicil of the debtor that it was adopted in England, 8 France, Germany, Switzerland, 5 and probably elsewhere. To illustrate: late in i918 the Brussels branch of
a German bank sent a check of a German customer for collection to a Belgian
bank at another place. After this bank collected the check and credited it to the
Brussels branch, the Belgian government seized the credit. The German Supreme
Court recognized that Belgium correctly liquidated the debt of the second bank
due to the branch and concluded that the customer could not require payment of
the proceeds.6 °
Thus, liquidation depended on the domicil of the debtor within the country and
enemy nationality of the creditor at the decisive time. A debt of a French dom" This seems to be the Dutch system. See VAN HASSELT, op. cit. supra note 31, at 474. But in
the absence of more literature available it does not seem clear whether the decision of the Hooge Raad,
January 20, 1939, \,VEr-KBLAI 569, regarding attachment of a foreigner's assets, does not imply some
broader rules concerning garnishment.
1
" Swiss Fed. Trib., 3 BGE. I 210, 521; 32 id. I 814; 47 id. 11I75: 56 id. III 50, 230; SMNIrTZen,
op. cit. supra note 42, at 338.
1

" See Rheinstein in (1934) 8 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR AUSLANDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALS PRIVATECHT
277.
" ANDRP WEiss, 4 TRAIT- DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVL (1912) 430-3; SAUSER-HALL, Op. Cit. spra
note I, at 8o n. x, citing ALEx. WAHLo,LE RPiGlIE FISCAL DES SocfTLs ET DES VALEUnS ETRANOdnes.

SI remember that Andr6 Weiss orally professed this doctrine as perfectly settled.
citations in Fuchs, supra note I, at 117.
" According to RAAPE, op. cit. supra note 28, at 284, either the state of the creditor or that of the
debtor has power to seize the debt.
"INew York Life v. Public Trustee [192412 Ch. D. zos. See also In re Queensland Mercantile &
Agency Co. [8gi I Ch.536, afl'd [1892] 1 Ch. 219, applying Scottish law to the question of priorities
between two conflicting assignments of a claim, since the debtors were resident in Scotland.
"SFrance: Circular letter of the French Prime Minister of December is, 1918, on the sequestration
of enemy property in Alsace-Lorraine, sub. II. Cf. the Decree of February 28, 1916, art. 2 (2) on the
declaration of debts at the domicil of the debtor.
Germany: Reichsgericht, June 2, 1923, 107 RGZ. 44, 46; same trib., May 2, 1924, io8 id. 265, 267;
Co See

same trib., March 18, 1931, X32 id. 128.
Switzerland: SAusER-HALL. op. cit. supra note I, at 8o.
"oReichsgericht, April 5, 1924, (1924) 29 DEUTSCHE JUtsTENZEITUNG, col. 828.
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iciliary due a German domiciled in England was, therefore, subject to liquidation
only in France.
It was also concluded therefrom that a Swiss domiciled in France validly discharged his debt to a German creditor by payment to the French custodian office,
whereas a debt of a Swiss domiciled outside of France due to a German domiciled
in France was not susceptible of liquidation.6 1 Allied custodians, however, did not
always feel bound to the latter restriction. In one case, the French sequestrator
wrote a letter to a Danish bank which never had a French branch to pay to him a
sum of Danish crowns representing the amount to the credit of a partnership carried
on by Germans in France and now in liquidation under French war measures. The
bank obliged by sending 22,ooo crowns. The German Supreme Court held that
the bank should not have obeyed and should pay over to the original creditors. 62
Disowning this entire conception, the Nationalist-Socialist confiscatory decrees
sought to take over the claims of the victims against foreign debtors, a pretension
rejected by American courts on the ground that a debt owed by a New York corporation to the firm affected by a confiscation was a property in New York and
63
could not be reached by the acts, decrees or laws of the German government.
Complications Arising from Business Branches
Some applications of the principle caused difficulties and discussions familiar in
the cases of garnishment were recalled, for example, when the danger of double
liability arose in a claim of the custodian or of the original creditor.
Outstanding was the problem of debts arising from engagements entered into by
the branch office of a foreign business organization. When a German debtor had
no branch in Belgium, he certainly could not escape an action by his creditor seeking to secure satisfaction out of his German assets, although he had assets in Belgium seized by the Belgian authorities. 4 In other words, the internal instructions
of the liquidating state were in conformity with the Treaty if they assigned marshalling privileges only to debts secured by local assets. The problem arose whether
the same principle should apply to branches.6 5
No doubt it is in the nature of a branch, as cdntrasted with a subsidiary corporation or agency, to form, in legal conception, an integral part of the enterprise.
Ordinarily, a debt contracted by a branch in its course of business may be enforced
by suing the principal establishment. But there are exceptions to this in peace
"' SAUSer-HALL, op. cit. supra note i, at 8o.
An erroneous argument for extending the scope of
liquidations was sometimes adduced from the apparently broad language of §2 of the annex to Arts.
297-298 of the Versailles Treaty. In the dominant opinion Art. 297(b) was decisive.
41 Reichsgericht, June 13, 1934, 145 RGZ. 16.
'n See the New York cases cited supra, note ig; see also Doa-xE', op. cit. supra note 6, at 335 on
freezing operations in occupied and Vichy France.
" These seem to be the facts of Brixhe et Deblon v. Wiirtembergische Transport Versicherungs
Gesclsehaft, Belgo-German Mixed Arb. Trib., June 8, 1925, 5 REcUEIL, supra note 4, at 696.
" This was answered in the affirmative, against a strongly motivated decision of the lower courts,
by the Belgian Court of Cassation, May 6, 1926, in Jacquain et Morelle v. Soci&t Nef & Cie., Pasicrisie,
1926, I 364, and a Belgian Royal Decree of September 21, 1926, MONITEUR BE.oG No. 267; also by an
early German decision, OLG. Hamburg, May 30, 1022, 5 HANSEATISCHE RacsrrnsTscHniFT 895 No. 184.
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times for the sake of convenience in the administration of such businesses."' So
the question arises, at which place should this debt be deemed "located" when the
assets of the branch are forcibly broken loose from the main body. An eminent
German writer has answered that any Englishman having dealt with the London
branch of the Deutsche Bank, for his credit account, could sue the latter's central
office in Berlin without regard to the possibility of being satisfied from the assets
of the London branch in liquidation and, conversely also, that the claim of a German national acquired by deposit with the branch in London, was exclusively situated in Berlin, outside of British territory, and therefore not susceptible of English
liquidation."' Although this is a simple solution, it hardly was intended by the
Peace Treaty. Since any customer or, for this matter, any contractual creditor of
the branch was entitled to sue the bank at the place of its branch in London, it
could not be denied that the debt was, in the language of the English courts, "recoverable, that is situate" there. At this juncture, the English Court of Appeals
rendered its only decision involving the subject in a law suit between the New
York Life Insurance Company as the debtor of the amount of a life insurance
policy, and the English Public Trustee."' The insurance was issued by the London
office of the company on the life of a German national and became payable during
the war. Judge Romer of the lower court declared the debt situated in New York.
The Court of Appeals, however, held that as the business of the plaintiff had several "residences" something more than the simple fact of residence was required to
constitute the location of the debt. It was, therefore, considered permissible and
necessary to look at the terms of the contract. From them it appeared, in Lord
Atkin's opinion, that in the case at bar no difficulty really existed at all "because
the actual contracts are expressed to be contracts to pay a sterling sum in Lon.
70
don." 9 "That right is situate in this country and only in this country."
Reliance was placed upon Dicey's conception that debts or causes in action are
generally to be looked upon as situated in the country where they are properly
recoverable or can be enforced. 71 Correspondingly the decision has been classified
by commentators as among those cases in which a bank debt was regarded as more
closely tied to the branch where the account is kept.72 Where a customer has his
account with the branch of a bank and dies, the local connection has been held
decisive for the purposes of legal representation, collection and administratio.la
The customer has to demand repayment at this branch7 4 and only in the case of
non-payment has he the right to sue the bank at its head office, apparently for dam-

ages rather than debt.7" In this environment, we need not be too surprised to see
40

Reichsgericht, June 25, x979, 96 RGZ. I6r.

" 7Fuchs, supra note i, at zx9.

e9 New York Life Ins. Co. v. Public Trustee [7924] 2 Ch. io.
1d. at 12r.
"Ild. at r22.

7 Dicey, CONFLICT OF LAWS (5th ed. by Keith, 1932) 340.
" CHmstRs,
op. dt. supra note 18, at 443 n. 394.
"8Rex v. Lovitt (1912] A. C. 212, 279.
"' Clare & Co. v. Dresdner Bank [x95] 2 K. B. 576; see Joachimson v. Swiss Bank Corp. [792]
3 K. B. 110, 127.
SCofelusion by Hill, J., in Richardson v. Richardson [1927] P. D. 228, 232, 234, from various
precedents, particularly Leader & Co. v. Direction der Disconto Gesellschaft (1914) 3 T. L. R. 83, 464.

SITUS PROBLEMS

Lord Atkins treat somewhat cavalierly the fear of the New York company that it
may be sued again in some country where it has branches or assets. Yet that danger is present; nor is it obviated by the probability that the creditor, being indemnified by his own government7 " would not make efforts through other channels.
Nevertheless, the theory of the court would have great attraction if it were to
be universally adopted. The German Supreme Court followed practically the same
course, when confronted with actions instituted against the German or Austrian
headquarters of liquidated branches.70 The court admitted the right of allied powers to liquidate the assets of a German branch and that a debt of the branch was
validly discharged by payment, in the course of liquidation, to an allied or neutral
creditor, and in the case of German creditors by liquidation of their claims.
Whereas the Reichsgericht declared it immaterial where the debt is payable, the
English court relies on elements of the debt, such as payability in London in sterling,
quite as in the leading case of garnishment. 77 However, in both cases it would
seem that emphasis was laid on the local contact with the branch rather than on
considerations of conflict of law. Assuredly, were the conflicts rules on contracts
not in the present state of chaos, the governing law and that of the situs might be
expected to follow identical criteria.
The two courts have established a common ground on which an international
conception may develop. A further contribution is to be found in two New York
cases dealing with the liability of a New York insurance company for policies issued
by its Russian branch in Czarist times.7 The Soviet decrees nationalizing the
branch abolished the claims of insurance holders in Russia; they did not seek to
cancel these debts outright.7" But this circumstance can hardly determine the effect
of the decrees in New York. 0 Despite largely identical facts the two decisions of
the highest New York court took the conflicting positions, respectively, that the
obligation of the insurance company had its source in the laws of New York; and
that the obligation rested on Russian law and had been destroyed by Soviet law.
Judge Lehman, though concurring in the result upon another ground, dissented
at this point in the second decision; he conceded that though situs was in Russia
for some purposes, it was not for others, and he stressed a printed clause in the
contract pledging all assets of the company to its fulfillment.
" Cf. Note (z925) 25 COL. L. Rxv. 366 at 367.
" Reichsgericht, June a, 1923, io7 RGZ. 44 (concerning the London branch of the Dresdner Bank,
a leading case, although dealing with negotiable instruments); dec. of May 2, 1924, zo8 id. 265 (branch

of a partnership in Madras); dec. of June 25, 1924, (1925) JuRt. WOcH. 248 (London branch of an
Austrian Corporation; dec. of April 3, 1925, iio RGZ. 380 (London branch of the Laenderbank in
Vienna); dec. of July II, 1925, (x926) JuR. WOCH. 1986 (deposit of an employee with the branch of
a German corporation in Rabaul, New Guinea); dec. of March 18, 1931, 132 RGZ. 128 (London branch
of the Swiss Bank Corporation, much discussed).
"See Swiss Bank Corp. v. Boehmische Industrial Bank [1923] 1 K. B. 673, 682.
"8Sliosberg v. New York Life Ins. Co., 244 N. Y. 482, 155 N. E. 749 (igas); Dougherty v.
Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 266 N. Y. 71, 193 N. E. 897 (1934).
"'See Lehman, J., in the Dougherty case, preceding footnote, 266 N. Y. at ioo-io9, 193 N. E. at
908-91.
"oNussbaum, Public Policy and the Political Crisis in the Conflict of Laws (940) 49 YALE L. J.
1027, 1039.
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The problem should be reduced to the inquiry whether, or to what extent, the
company was freed from liability for the debts of the branch, by the fact of expropriation. As is well known, a branch, although an integral part of the enterprise,
nevertheless, has a certain life of its own within the state of its establishment. 8' Any
branch is customarily subject to a great number of administrative provisions of the
state in which it operates. Branches of foreign corporations carrying on business in
insurance, banking, transportation and other public utilities are controlled to a
very high degree. In a case that has become famous, Judge Lehman himself attributed to the New York branch of a Russian insurance company a distinct personality
because of the intensive control exercised by the state. s2 The converse case of insurance policies issued by Russian branches of New York companies is comparable,
the Czarist Russian government having required the insurance to be submitted to
Russian law. Analogous submissions have been taken as grounds by the Swiss Federal Tribunal for holding an insurance contract inaccessible to French war measures, 8 and again by the German Supreme Court for assuming that an insurance
policy issued by an Indian branch of the New York Life Insurance Company, later
transferred to the Berlin branch of the company, could not be validly seized by the
British custodian in India.s4 The contact of any branch, particularly in the field of
banking or insurance operations, with the state in which they occur, is so comprehensive that very often the domesticating nature of the license for doing business has
been exaggerated. This relation, however, is such as to make it seem natural that a
local government taking over or destroying the branch by an exceptional act of sovereignty should include the debts with the assets. Obviously, this was what the
Court of Appeals thought.
In accordance with this view, the British Public Trustee of the last war paid
allied and neutral creditors 5 out of the seized assets. The French Court of Cassation, disapproving of a partly contrary practice, based its analogous opinion not only
on the liability of a debtor's assets for his debts, but, as the case concerned Alsace,
on Section 419 of the German Civil Code declaring the transferee of the assets of
another person liable by force of law to pay the debts of the transferor.8"
The creditor, of course, has a claim in case the means of the branch are insufficient and insofar as the enterprise has been enriched by the contract or tort, on
which his original cause of action rested."7 Ancient parallels of the Roman actio
de peculio deve in rem verso come to the mind.
" Carl Wieland (1924) 43 (N. S.) ZEITSCHRIFT FfR SCHWEIZERISCHES REcHT 271.

ilar to those above have been suggested, as early as

592o,

Conclusions sim-

by Ernst Wolff, (1920) Jun. Wocmt. 6o8;

(i92i)

id. 245.

"'Moscow Fire Ins. Co. v. Bank of New York & Trust Co., 28o N. Y. 286, 2o N. E. (2d) 758
(1939), aff'd 309 U. S. 624 (940).
88 Swiss Fed. Trib., Nov. 4, 1920,' 46 BGE. II 421.
84Reichsgericht Nov. 11, 1920, (1921) JUtM.WOc.
245.
"'Fuchs, supra note i, at 209 n. 18.
" Deutschmann v. Schissel6, Cass.-civ., Feb. 5, 1924, (1924) REv. JurnD. D'ALSACE Er n

with instructive note by Wilhelm.
" This need has been recognized, with some doubts, by Gilligan, supra note 14, at

986.

Lotn. 277,
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In the last war complications arose from irresponsible waste by trustee administration in probably all belligerent countries. But this lies beyond our subject.
III. SITUS oF CORPORATE STOCK
The Versailles Treaty extended the right of liquidation to all participations in
business associations deemed to be in Allied or associated countries. This was not
expressly stated in the basic provision of Article 297b, but is nevertheless covered by
the text. To implement the provision, Section io, Paragraph i, in the annex to
Article 298, obligated Germany to deliver within six months to each of the Allied
and Associated Powers "all securities, certificates, deed or other documents of tide,
including any shares, stock, debentures, debenture stocks or other obligations of
any company incorporated in accordance with the laws of that Power." The Note
of the Allied powers of May 22, i919, asserted that Section io included merely a

technical method for liquidating German interests in Allied territories. On these
facts the question was highly controversial: in what territory were the shares and
certificates situated? Section io seemed to suggest this was in the state in which
a corporation was organized. German and Swiss writers agreed that German-owned
shares in a Swiss corporation, therefore, were exempt from liquidation, irrespective
of the location of the certificates, but disagreed on the analogous treatment of participations in German incorporated companies?8
American decisions culminating in the opinions of two great jurists in the
Disconto-Gesellschaft case"9 have focussed attention on an important phase of the
matter that was neglected elsewhere, namely, the difference in legal character between the various kinds of certificates. At common law, shares cannot be transferred except by registration on the company's books. Certificates of stock have
merely evidentiary value. This conception has continued to underlie many present
statutes which at the same time allow the issue of certificates, indorsed in blank
and transferable by delivery and yet not conferring the membership itself without
subsequent registration. Such was the character, for instance, ascribed in an American'0 and a Canadian 1 case to certificates of the Canadian Pacific Railway. Accordingly, seizure by the American Alien Property Custodian and the Canadian
Trustee respectively, were effective at the place of the corporation, irrespective of
transfers of the certificates abroad. Also bearer shares and bearer debentures of a
gold mine in Transvaal were held to be situated and subject to seizure as enemy
property within the Union, irrespective of the place in which the certificates were
2
to be found
Under English law and the Uniform Stock Transfer Act, however, registered
" For the German viewpoint, see

IsAY,

supra note i, at 95 and Fuchs, supra note x, at 126; for the

Swiss, SAUSaR-HALL, supra note x, at 69, 70.

"' Disconto-Gesellschaft v. U. S. Steel Corp., 267 U. S. 22 (1925), opinion by Mr. Justice Holmes,
afl'g 300 Fed. 741, opinion by Judge Learned Hand.

"United Cigarette Mach. Co. v. Canadian Pacific Ry. Co., i2 F. (2d) 634 (C. C. A. 2d, 1926).
', Spitz v. Sec. of State of Canada [939] 2 Dom. L. R. 546 (Exch. Ct. Can.).
o, Randfontain Gold Mining Co. v. Custodian of Enemy Prop. [1923] A. D. 576 (App. Div. So. Afr.).
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certificates, indorsed in blank or in similar form, incorporate the rights of the owner
to demand registration as the owner of membership upon the books of the corporation. "Title to a certificate and to the share represented thereby can be transferred only by delivery of the instrument. 0 3 Accordingly, in the DiscontoGesellschaft case seizure of the shares deposited in London by the English public
trustee forfeited them, in the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States."4
The same view must be true for shares of the European companies conferring membership on the bearer.
At the beginning of the last war, thousands of American certificates, belonging
to German or other nationals, were in deposit of London banks for the account of
German banks. The certificates were seized by the American custodian. It has
been said that in recognition of the situs at the place of incorporation, the English
trustee by a post-war agreement, delivered the certificates to the American custodian." This may have referred to those certificates in which the shares were not
fully merged. In one American case, the English trustee seems to have yielded to
the petition of the American office for possession of participations in a voting trust,
which indeed were transferable only on the books of the corporation."
Thus there was no square decision concerning certificates issued under the New
York or New Jersey law, according to the Uniform Act, deposited in a London
bank claimed by both American and the English offices.
In what position were neutral companies? The courts have touched but cautiously on this problem. Mr. Justice Holmes asserted the theoretical right of the
total governmental powers, federal and state, to "recognize nothing concerning the
corporation or any interest in it that happened outside. But it prefers to consider
itself civilized and to act accordingly." 9 Hence the indorsement in blank could
work in favor of the English Public Trustee. But if the United States bad taken
a conflicting step, its "paramount power" over the corporation would prevail.
The question, therefore, arises whether, or in what circumstances, a state or
nation that has allowed its own corporations to issue bearer certificates going out
into the financial markets of the world will find itself justified in restricting the normal effect of their circulation. Police power in its enhanced shape as war power has
its own needs and prerogatives. Nevertheless, it is a great merit of the courts of
this country to have connected the problem with the normal considerations of commercial convenience and legal construction.
3

" Uniform Stock Transfer Act, §x, 6 U. L. A. (1922).
REV. 89.

On the problem, see Note (1932) 32 COL. L.

"' Disconto-Geselischaft v. U. S. Steel Corp., supra note 89; cf. Pomerance, The Situs of Stocl( (1932)
17 CORN. L. Q. 43, 57; Note (1927) 15 CALIF. L. REv. 145, 153.
" (x927) 6 RECHTSVEPRFOLGUNG It INTERNATIONALEN VEnxRHR, Part I, 67.

"' Miller v. Kaliwerke Aschersleben Aktien-Gesellschaft, 283 Fed. 746 (C. C. A. 2d, 1922).
" See Disconto-Gesellscbaft v. U. S. Steel Corp., 267 U. S. 22, 28 (1925).

